Abstract: Federalism in Germany is characterised by an emphasis on a symmetrical allocation of competencies, the intergovernmental sharing of responsibilities and resources and on vertical and horizontal joint policy-making, leading to a very dense and strictly symmetrical and multilateral system of intergovernmental relations. Since the late 1970s, but especially since Unification in 1990, this system has come under considerable stress. On the one hand, party competition is increasingly played out through the Bundesrat, the body representing the Länder governments at the federal level, making intergovernmental coordination more difficult and leading to accusations of 'Reformstau' (reform log jam). On the other hand, Unification not only added five new Länder to the system, but also led to economic disparities between the Länder at a hitherto unknown level, and deepened territorial conflicts over Länder competencies and the allocation of finances. Both developments have made led to demands for a reform of the federal structure aimed at disentangling joint policy-making structures to ensure greater autonomy for both the federal level and the Länder. But, as the paper will argue, the developments have resulted in a triangular constellation of interests between the federal level, the richer and the poorer Länder that makes reforming the system almost impossible.
Introduction
As outlined in the introduction to this special issue, the term 'intergovernmental relations' (IGR) captures "the working connections that tie central governments to those constituent units that enjoy measures of independent and inter-dependent political power, governmental control and decision-making" (Agranoff, 2004: 26) , with 'working connections' referring both to the institutional and formalised structures of IGR and to the actual patterns or modes of interaction. Both are expected to differ according to a more federalised logic, where constitutional categories of multi-level government are considered as important factors shaping intergovernmental relations and a more multi-level governance logic, where the mode of IGR is driven by the specific interests and political capacities of the lower level governments rather than constitutional norms.
Under the comparative federalism scenario, as argued in the introduction, it is assumed that in federal states, where subnational governments have constitutional status and share sovereignty with the central level, this will also feed into the formal and informal structures and patterns of IGR leading to predominantly symmetrical multilateral rather than bilateral coordination structures. Secondly, that given that their rights and competencies are constitutionally guaranteed and can only be altered with their consent, it is expected constitutional reforms involving a (re)allocation of competencies will have to treat subnational units equally, thus creating or perpetuating symmetry of competence allocation over time. Finally, given the shared sovereignty between the levels and the lack of a constitutional hierarchy that would allow either level to define the competencies of the other, party political incongruence between the levels or between subnational authorities is expected to have a major -disruptive -impact on the patterns of IGR.
This comparative federalism scenario is contrasted in the introduction with a multi-level governance scenario. Here, constitutionally defined resources are expected to have less of an impact on the patterns of IGR, long-term competence allocation of competencies or the impact of party incongruence than other important informational or political resources which subnational governments have at their disposal. The particular pattern of IGR is thus assumed to be driven by the specific interests and political capacities of the lower level governments.
As a result, long-term constitutional developments, and the competence (re)allocation in particular, are also assumed to reflect less the constitutional position of subnational governments resources and more the shifts in the balance of power resources more generally.
Finally, the relative impact of party incongruence on patterns of IGR coordination is expected to depend on the characteristics of individual lower level governments rather than the constitutional setting these governments are embedded in.
As will be shown in the following, dynamics in the German federal system mainly follows the federalism scenario developed in the introduction. Federalism in Germany is characterised by an emphasis on a symmetrical allocation of competencies, the intergovernmental sharing of responsibilities and resources and on vertical and horizontal joint policy-making to generate common nation-wide standards of public policy, resulting in its description as 'cooperative' and 'unitary' federalism. Constitutional norms of the German federal system had the major and most important impact on the development of a system of very dense, strictly symmetrical and multilateral IGR.
Since the 1970s, and especially since Unification in 1990, this system of symmetric and multilateral IGR has come increasingly under stress due to two main sources for conflict. On the one hand, since the system was basically in place before the bi-polar party system fully developed, party incongruence and growing polarisation between the two main parties had the expected negative impact on intergovernmental co-ordination. On the other hand, divergent economic developments of the Länder and regional disparities, especially since the accession of the five new Länder, have led to severe territorial conflicts over Länder competencies and the allocation of finances. As a result, Germany has gradually changed towards a more 'asymmetric' federal system, which takes on some features of the multi-level scenario.
Negotiations within the system of IGR have become at the same time more difficult and more open, fluid and unpredictable. Yet while this development increased the pressure for a reform of the federal structures, the symmetric allocation of competencies or the formal multilateral structures of IGR have remained remarkably stable.
The paper is structured as follows. The first section will give a short overview over the constitutional structures of German federalism including an outline over the development of German interlocked politics. This is followed by an overview over the structures of IGR.
Section three and four analyse the impact of both, the German party system and the growing impact of party incongruence and polarisation as well as the increasing territorial conflicts on the formal structures and working patterns of IGR. Section 5 briefly discussed the latest federal reforms in 2006 and 2009. The final section discusses the results in light of the overarching questions of this special issue and concludes.
The Constitutional Framework of German Federalism
Germany is the classic example of co-operative and symmetric federalism. In contrast to other federal states, the distribution of competences between the federal level, the 'Bund', and the subnational units, the 'Länder', does not follow a material, but rather a functional logic: while the main legislative competences lie with the federal level, most administrative competences are assigned to the Länder. Article 70 GG does state that the 'Länder shall have the right to legislate insofar as this Constitution does not confer legislative power on the Federation', but the Basic Law (Grundgesetz, German Constitution) provides ample opportunities for federal legislation, in particular through the concurrent and (former) framework competencies, if and to the extent that there was a 'need' for the 'creation of equivalent living conditions throughout the country' or 'the maintenance of legal and economic unity' (Art. 72 para. 2 GG). As a result, the residual, exclusive competencies of the Länder are limited to a small number of legislative powers, mainly in the areas of local government, policing, education and cultural affairs including the media. This is, however, compensated in two ways: First, Article 83 GG assigns the Länder both the right and the duty to 'execute federal Laws in their own right' although the federal level maintains a right to regulate administrative procedures as well (Art. 84 GG). Second, the Länder participate in federal legislation through the Bundesrat. The Bundesrat differs from other second chambers in federal systems in that it consists of Länder government representatives, i.e. the Minister President and cabinet members. The Länder have between three and six votes (depending on their population size), which have to be cast en bloc and cannot be split. The Bundestag not only has the right to initiate federal legislation by submitting bills to the Bundestag (a right it makes use of relatively rarely), but also has to deliberate and pass all federal laws. The veto power of the Bundesrat depends on the impact a federal law has on the Länder. In the case of consent laws (Zustimmungsgesetze), where important financial or administrative interests of the Länder are concerned, the Bundesrat has an absolute veto. In all other cases (objection laws, Einspruchsgesetze), an objection (i.e. a suspensive veto) by the Bundesrat can be overruled by the Bundestag (Art. 77 GG) In addition, constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority in both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat.
The development towards the system of functional division and strong co-decision rights of the Bundesrat was also supported by decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court. In the mid-1950s (supported by subsequent decisions), the Court had ruled that the evaluation of the 'need' for federal legislation was essentially a political question and thus not subject to the adjudication of the Court' (BVerfGE 2, 213; Kisker 1989: 40) . In turn, the Court also strengthened the Bundesrat, for example by adhering to the 'Unity Principle' (Einheitsprinzip), which means the consent of the Bundesrat is necessary for the whole legislative proposal -and not just the parts that directly impact the financial or administrative interests of the Länder (BVerfG 8, 247; Kisker 1989: 41) . As a result, a Bundesrat veto can be used to block the whole bill and for reasons unrelated to the implementation.
Although the basic structure of the German federal system was already enshrined in the 1949 Basic Law, it was the 'Great Finance Reform' of 1969 that gave the system its final format (Benz 1999: 63) . Until then, the tension between the aim of providing 'uniform living conditions' and the fact that some Länder were burdened more heavily than others by the consequences of World War II meant that the federal level had to step in and provide the necessary financial means in the form of grants. And while the Bund was able to afford this due to the overall favourable economic development and high revenues during the 1950s, the downside was an uncontrolled growth of grants to the Länder and of mixed expenditures, which not only lacked a constitutional basis but also represented an encroachment on Länder competences. The finance reform of 1969 (for further information Renzsch 1991) introduced the Joint Tasks, which turned regional development policy, agriculture and fishery, university construction and education planning, originally competencies of the Länder, into matters of intergovernmental decision-making (Article 91 GG). In addition, the reform amended the fiscal constitution by expanding the system of revenue sharing originally established in 1955 and adapted the financial equalisation scheme. Thus, as Benz has argued, the reform did not so much introduce new provisions as create a constitutional basis for the existing cooperation:
'Interlocking politics was thus consolidated ' (1999: 63) . As a result, the symmetrical and cooperative elements of the federal system are also apparent in the financial constitution. The most important taxes (income tax, capital gains tax, VAT and corporation tax), which raise ca. two thirds of the overall revenue, are shared between the Bund and the Länder. With the exception of a few minor taxes, all taxes are regulated at the federal level -including those allocated to the Länder (Article 105 GG). Federal legislation on revenues needs the consent of the Bundesrat, which gives the Länder collective influence, but individually the Länder have little opportunity to set tax rates, which are the same across Germany. Finally, a mechanism of fiscal equalization levels out regional financial disparities amongst the Länder, so that no Land falls below 99.5% of the average financial strength.
As the short overview demonstrates, the German federal system mainly tries to achieve symmetry and equality, which clearly confirms the dynamics expected for the 'federalism scenario'. Although the Länder differ with regard to their size and economic power, they all have exactly the same rights and competencies. Even more, the German system is geared towards eliminating territorial differences not only by levelling out financial differences between the Länder, but also through a uniform provision of public services and nation-wide standards of public policy. Given that the fundamental rationale for the system is the aim of achieving and maintaining equivalent living conditions, rather than promoting territorial diversity, the two levels of government are therefore 'bound together in a perpetual process of coordination designed to secure the consensus necessary for policy to be made and implemented' (Jeffery 1999a: 133) . The following will therefore investigate how the constitutional logic inherent in German federalism is reflected in the working structures of IGR. However, most IGR in the German federal system are based on voluntary coordination (freiwillige Koordination). The term voluntary relates to the fact that these forms of IGR are neither constitutionally demanded nor based on secondary legislation. In addition, decisions are politically, but not legally binding, and both single Länder and the Bund can resort to their autonomous competencies in cases where an agreement cannot be reached (Kropp 2010: 125 ).
Managing Interlocked
This should not imply, however, that voluntary IGR are informal, indeed they are often based on executive agreements or even treaties between the Länder. The term voluntary is also somewhat misleading, as the formal structures of the federal system make cooperation an inherent necessity.
The German system of interlocked politics has been most famously captured with the term 'joint policy making' ('Politikverflechtung', Scharpf et al. 1976) , and the development of IGR can be seen as a response. Not only does the federal level need the consent of (a majority of) the Länder governments in the Bundesrat in a broad range of policy areas, but the Länder also implement most of the federal level's legislation (they also employ the vast majority of Standing Committees consisting of the heads of department (Kropp 2010: 137f.) .
Since Unification, the dense network of ministerial conferences has become even more intricate. Given the specific interests of the new Länder, the East German Minister Presidents decided as early as 1990 to set up their own Conference (MPK-East) to coordinate their positions for negotiations that are of particular concern for them. Similarly, whenever issues affecting especially the East German Länder are on the agenda of Conferences, the East German Ministers meet beforehand to agree on a common position.
Below the political level, finally, we find numerous committees, commissions and working groups at all levels of the administration both with and without the participation of federal However, the development of a network of voluntary IGR that is denser and more extensive than in most federal systems (Watts, 2003) Länder became much more difficult, not only because majorities were no longer congruent, but also because the two main parties adopted strongly opposing positions on a range of policy issues and conflicts became highly ideological (Benz 1999: 64) . As a result, the reform processes of the 1950s and 1960s lost momentum and major reform plans, such as the territorial reorganisation of the Länder or a comprehensive constitutional reform, failed (ibid.). What had until then been a latent problem turned into a manifest and lasting one: as Lehmbruch famously argued (2000 Lehmbruch famously argued ( [1976 ), the German political system combines two basically incompatible sets of rules of the game. While the federal structure with its emphasis on vertical and horizontal joint policy-making makes cooperative orientations and the search for compromises necessary, the bipolar party system is based on competition, and the two will clash violently in times of 'divided government' when the majority in the Bundestag does not control a majority in the Bundesrat, or even worse, is faced with a hostile majority.
Coordination between the Bund and the Länder, and between Bundestag and the Bundesrat in particular, can then become subject to and severely hampered by the -often public -power play between the governing majority and the opposition parties. Chancellors have, especially in times of narrow Bundesrat majorities, also tried to break up the multilateral setting of IGR, for example by inviting only the Minister Presidents belonging to their own party to prepare Bundesrat decisions (Kropp 2010: 129) . Such negotiations are more than questionable from a constitutional point of view, and the Constitutional Court repeatedly ruled them out with reference to the principle of 'federal comity' ('Bundestreue)' (Kisker 1989: 40) . The principle obliges both the Bund and the Länder to behave loyally towards the union, and the Court has treated this as a constitutional obligation 'to act in a profederal manner [that] prohibits the federation from trying to "divide and conquer"' (cited from Kommers 1994: 482) .
Since Unification in 1990, the party system has again undergone changes, leading not only to the emergence of a new party, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS, successor to the former GDR Unity Party SED), but also a regionalised and asymmetric party system. In the East German Länder, the PDS was able to consolidate its electoral base during the 1990s, respectively (Leonardy 2002: 184ff.) . iv Thus, given that the East German Länder also meet beforehand to discuss issues of particular concern for them, some decisions now have to go through at least three different rounds of party political, East-West and finally joint Länder negotiations.
The problem for such 'mixed coalitions' is that they have a relationship of both loyalty and opposition to the Government at the federal level. The problem for such mixed coalitions is that votes in the Bundesrat cannot be split but have to be cast en bloc. They therefore tend to agree in their coalition contracts to abstain in Bundesrat votes if an internal coalition consensus cannot be found. However, although formally admissible, of course, it is not really possible to adopt a 'neutral stance' in the Bundesrat. Given that according to Article 52 (3) GG, decisions in the Bundesrat may only be adopted with a majority of all 69 votes, and not of the votes cast, abstaining from a vote means basically the same as voting against a motion.
As a result, Bundesrat decisions to object to a bill have become more difficult, while absolute vetoes (i.e. the non-adoption of a consent law) are more likely. Schröder, where the opposition parties CDU/CSU and FDP pushed for more far-reaching reforms than the government had initially proposed (Auel 2010 ).
As the above shows, party incongruence and divided government did and continue to have a major, and generally disruptive, impact as expected under the federalism scenario. Given the absence of a constitutional hierarchy, party conflicts cannot be avoided by withdrawing competencies from the Länder level and can therefore be fully fed into the system of IGR.
This has not, however, led to a massive legislative deadlock in German federalism. Rather, 
Territorial Conflicts: The Thorny Issue of 'Our Money'
What should not be overlooked, however, is that party incongruence is not the only factor that challenges smooth policy-making within the interlocked structures of German federalism. Until the 1970s the Länder were relatively homogenous with regard to their economic and fiscal powers. In addition, growing tax revenues provided the federal level with the necessary funds for distributive policies aimed at easing out regional disparities (Benz 1999: 63) . Cracks in the system did, however, already appear in the 1970s. The growing polarisation of party competition outlined above was accompanied by increasing territorial disparities resulting from divergent economic developments in the northern Länder with their emphasis on declining heavy industries and the less industrialized southern Länder that emerged as new centres of technology-led growth. In addition, increasing budgetary constraints meant hat regional policies turned into a more conflictual issue (Benz 2007: 423) , especially with regard to the financial equalization scheme between the richer and the poorer Länder (Renzsch, 1991: 261-273; Jeffery 2005) . Available revenues made the continuation of distributive policies possible, albeit at a reduced level, and in the 1980s conflicts over the subsidies to economically weak Länder and the fiscal equalisation scheme intensified.
However, while a complete deadlock did not occur, the system permitted only incremental change that dealt with symptoms rather than tackling underlying causes.
The apparent inadequacies of the system, especially the incapacity of the federal level to make redistributive decisions against the interest cartel of the Länder, have been famously analysed by Scharpf: Within the structures of 'Politikverflechtung' outlined above, the danger of deadlocks can only be met with strategies of conflict minimisation (Scharpf et al. 1976: 62-65; 1988: 260) that avoid discrimination between the interests of involved actors or redistributive decisions. At the same time, however, such decision-making systems are extremely difficult to reform, since involved actors will oppose any threat to their veto power over policy decisions even though the outcomes of policy-making processes are likely to be inefficient (Scharpf 2006: 849) . The actors are thus caught in a 'joint decision trap' (Scharpf 1988; 1997: 211-212) : in a structure which out of its own institutional logic, systematically produces inefficient and problem inadequate decisions, that at the same time, however, is unable to change the institutional conditions of its decision-making logic.
Unification in 1990 could thus have provided the necessary window of opportunity for an encompassing reform of the constitutional structures: After the fall of the Wall in 1989, the question arose whether German Unification would require a new constitution (since the German Basic Law was considered 'provisional' during the separation). However, the Kohl government was keen to avoid any delay to Unification caused by a potentially lengthy constitutional debate. As a compromise, the new Länder acceded under the existing Basic
Law, but a Bundestag-Bundesrat Commission was set up with the task of drafting constitutional amendments. The question of whether to overhaul the system of fiscal equalisation or of how to incorporate the new Länder into the existing system was additionally delayed (at the demand of the old Länder) by the establishment of the, federally funded, German Unification Fund that financed financial transfers to the East German Länder until 1995.
The result of these postponements was twofold: First, by the time decisions were made on the incorporation of the Länder into the fiscal equalisation scheme and on the constitutional changes in the early 1990s, the full extent of the economic problems of the new Länder had not only become apparent, their economic situation had become worse. Second, and even more importantly, by that time the new Länder were incorporated into the federal decisionmaking system and thus able form a veto coalition together with other economically weaker
Länder against any reform of the system that would threaten their financial subsidies. As a result, any major change to the existing fiscal equalisation scheme proved impossible and the window of opportunity for reform was basically closed. Consequently, the Solidarpakt I (adopted in 1993) simply incorporated the new Länder into the fiscal equalisation scheme.
What is more, the Länder were able to 'gang up' on the federal level and force the latter to foot the largest part of the bill: To avoid massive redistributive conflicts, the large financial transfers to the Eastern Länder were financed by both, expanding the Länder share of the VAT revenue from 37 to 44 per cent and large contributions by the federal level, who compensated the expenditure partly through taxes (a solidarity surcharge on income tax). The
Pact lasted until the end of 2004 and was followed by the Solidarpakt II (adopted in 2001), which basically extended the first agreement to 2019. For the constitutional reform in 1994, matters relating to the fiscal constitution had been excluded altogether. Unsurprisingly, the outcome was hardly ground-breaking either. vii Yet although the federal level shouldered the main burden of the financial support for the new Länder, the Solidarity Pacts were not able to prevent regional disparities from deepening further, and the German federal system became 'bi-polarised between a pro-autonomy "rich south" and a pro-federal "poor east" (Jeffery 2008: 590) . While party conflict and government incongruence continue to have a great impact, the deepening of the territorial cleavage developed into an additional major disruptive factor regarding the ability of the IGR coordination machine to produce a consensus. The Länder not only have to be able to coordinate their own policies, they also have to be able to come to strong consensual, or at least majority, decisions to maximise their collective influence through the Bundesrat (or other coordination bodies). Such agreements can either be based on a party or a territorial logic. The intensification of territorial conflicts has made agreements along territorial interests increasingly difficult, but has also impacted intra-party coordination. Due to the deepening territorial cleavage, party organisations at the Länder level have to adopt territory specific policy positions, and Land politicians are increasingly prepared to advocate their Land interests even against their own national party. As a result, coordination also within the parties -both horizontally between the Länder and vertically between the Länder and the federal level -has become more difficult, and the ability of the parties to integrate interests and defuse conflicts throughout the system has weakened: 'Vertically integrated parties find it difficult to articulate territorial conflicts; their strength lies precisely in overcoming them through the bonding cement -the common political program, joint electoral successeswithin the party' (Detterbeck and Renzsch 2008: 52, translation K.A.) .
Another outcome of this 'new territorialism' is the development of informal forms of cooperation between smaller number of Länder and an increase in strategic bargaining between single Länder and the federal government. In addition to the five new Länder, the financially more successful Länder, mainly Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and Hesse, have also started to cooperate, albeit more informally, to push their specific interests (see below). 
Groundhog Day: After the Reform is Before the Reform
Given the developments outlined above, it is hardly surprising that the topic of a reform of the federal structures remained on the agenda from the mid-1990s onwards. Despite manifold pressures that had existed long before, but increased with Unification, Germany lagged behind other European countries in embracing structural reforms to its health care, pension and social security system or its highly regulated labour market. The interlocked federal structures were considered the main cause for the (in)famous 'Reformstau' ('reform logjam'), hampering fundamental reforms due to the veto power of the Bundesrat and strangling the Länder in a tight corset of centralised legislation and the fiscal constitution. viii Especially the richer Länder in the South (mainly Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, but also Hesse) felt overly burdened by the fiscal equalisation scheme, but also unduly restricted in their autonomy. From the late 1990s onwards, they demanded greater legislative autonomy and, in particular, greater financial room for manoeuvre, a development that Jeffery captured with the term 'Sinatra doctrine' alluding to Frank Sinatra's popular song 'My Way' (Jeffery 1999b ). In 1998, Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and Hesse filed a claim with the Federal Constitutional
Court against the fiscal equalisation scheme. Although the claim ultimately failed, they were in the end successful in putting the issue of a federal reform on the political agenda.
After years of debate, a lengthy reform process began in 2003. The joint decision trap, however, was as ready to snap shut as ever (Auel 2008) . First, the reform of the fiscal constitution, and the equalisation scheme in articular, had to be excluded form the Since Unification, this system of symmetric co-operative federalism and multilateral IGR geared towards encompassing symmetry and equality has been under considerable stress. This is mainly due to the fact that the window of opportunity opened by Unification had not been used for a fundamental reform of the federal structures. Rather, the new Länder acceded under the existing Basic Law, which not only greatly exacerbated problems due to the weak economic development of the new Länder, but also made agreements even more difficult and thus basically cemented the existing structures. Both, regional disparities, in particular between East and West, but also between Western Länder, and the changes to party competition and coalition formation have challenged former patterns of Länder co-ordination along territorial or party interests. This, in turn, had consequences the coordination with the federal level both within the Bundesrat and in the structures of IGR.
First, while the party logic had been the most important factor in -and hamperingvertical as well as horizontal IGR, the territorial logic has greatly gained in importance since
Unification. Given the territorial disparities, but also the variety of coalition constellations, Länder party leaders have become more independent and more prepared to advocate their specific territorial interests. As a result, the parties have lost at least part of their ability to defuse conflicts between the Länder and between the Länder and the federal level.
Second, and as a result, the outcome of negotiations has become far more unpredictable and dependent on random factors (Benz 1999: 71) , with negative, but also positive consequences. On the one hand, negotiations involve a greater number of interests, both party political and territorial, making deadlock and non-reforms generally more likely. On the other hand, the diversity of territorial interests combined with the fact that clear opposing camps have been replaced by greater variety in the party constellations of Länder coalition governments also opened up opportunities for more flexible negotiations with variable majorities.
Whether both developments will actually lead to IGR following more closely the multilevel scenario, rather than the comparative federalism scenario, remains to be seen. So far, the multilateral system of IGR has remained fairly unchanged, but we do observe groups are no indications that this will change anytime soon, as German federalism is faced with a fundamental dilemma: on the one hand, the growing demands for greater autonomy and fiscal responsibility by the richer Länder cannot be accommodated within the symmetric and cooperative federal system. The Länder right to deviate from federal legislation is an innovative new instrument in this regard, but it only applies to a small number of specific policy areas, and so far there are no studies on how often it has actually be used. On the other hand, any constitutional change towards greater Länder autonomy and competitive or asymmetric federalism would increase territorial disparities and thus reinforce the asymmetry in terms of economic development, in particular between East and West. And since the poorer Länder are in a majority in the Bundesrat, and constitutional reforms have to be adopted with a two-thirds majority in both Bundestag and Bundesrat, more far reaching reforms are fairly unlikely.
